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CR.fINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
cient to satisfy a court which did not draw the
testimonial-physical evidence distinction or a
court which followed the federal exclusionary evi-
dence rule. '"- Indications are. however, that the
'5 The decisions thus far are concentrated at the
trial court level, and it should be pointed out that New
York draws the testimonial-physical evidence distinc-
tion with respect to the self-incrimination privilege
and does not follow the federal exclusionary rule with
courts will favor it and, by so doing, will strengthen
the statutes which prohibit driving while under the
influence of alcohol.53
respect to illegally seized evidence. People v. Defore,
242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
13 Note the favorable remarks by the Court in foot-
note to the majority opinion in Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957); and see Weinstein, Statute
Compelling Submission to a Chemical Test for Intoxica-
tion, 45 J. Crim. L. 541 (1955).
INDIRECT CONTROL OF ORGANIZED CRIME THROUGH LIQUOR
LICENSE PROCEDURE
MALCOLM M. GAYNOR
Since gambling is the life blood of organized
crime,' any method through which gambling
can be combatted is of great importance to law
enforcement officials.
In order for large gambling establishments to
operate successfully, they usually have to provide
for the service of intoxicating liquor to their pa-
trons. Observation of legalized gambling casinos
in Nevada discloses that operators consider liquor
a stimulant to gambling inasmuch as it is dis-
tributed free to patrons. It should be noted, how-
ever, that liquor is a detriment to some types of
gambling. For example, in the case of horse parlors
the patrons have sufficient interest in the gambling
itself that consumption of liquor serves only to
intensifv dissatisfaction in the losing inebriate.
In addition to liquor being served in gambling
establishments, it is sometimes true that taverns
are used as fronts for gambling activities con-
ducted on the premises. Most of the important
gambling places in the Chicago area are licensed
to sell liquor.*-' Where a gambling establishment
is licensed to sell liquor, the state statutory liquor
license procedure assumes significance to the law
enforcement officer. This procedure provides an
inherently effective weapon against criminal or-
ganization.3
ISenate Special Committee To Investigate Or-
ganized Crime In Interstate Commerce, Third luterim
Report, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong.. 1st Sess. 2 (1951).
2 Interview with Virgil Peterson, Operating Director
of the Chicago Crime Commission. July 1, 1957.
3 Note should be made of the fact that there are three
distinct theories of liquor control systems: (1) The
revenue system, in which the primary concern "3 the
enforcement of revenue raising provisions of th. a%,
and the suspension of illegal sale is left to the local
police. (2) The regulatory system, under which the
primary duty of the state administrative agency is the
Basically, there are two ways in which the
liquor license procedure can be used to attack
gambling: the first, is by seeking revocation of the
license; the other method is to employ the proce-
dure with a view to putting the illegal enterprise
itself out of business. The latter may be accom-
plished either by prosecution of the violators for a
crime, or by the ancillary means of publicity and
harassment, factors tending to weaken substan-
tially the alliance between illegal activity and
politics.
4
As long ago as the seventeenth century it was
held that a license to sell liquor passes no vested
interest to the licensee, but only makes lawful
an act which otherwise would be unlawful.
5
Behind this rule was a desire to keep criminal
elements out of the taverns and inns where liquor
regulation of the industry, and the collection of fees
is left to another branch of government. (3) The
monopoly system, under which the state combines its
functions as revenue raiser, regulator, and proprietor.
These theories are, in practice, combined in the systems
in effect in most of the states, and it is sometimes hard
to tell which motive has the primary expression in any
given statutory scheme. Shipman, State Admnistrati'e
M][achinery for Liquor Control, 7 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 602 (1940). However, it is clear that those states
which put a premium upon revenue suffer in regulation
of the industry.
4 Publicity is the natural enemy of organized crime,
since the officials connected with criminal organizations
cannot politically afford to have their names associated
with crime.
5 Thomas v. Sorrell, 7 Vaughn 330, 124 Eng. Rep.
1098 (1674). See Johnson & Kessler, The Liquor License
Syslem-Its Origin and Constitulional Deelopment,
15 N.Y.L.Q. 210 (1938) for an excellent exposition of
the development of the doctrine that the liquor license
is a mere privilege rather than a vested right.
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was sold.6 Thus, attempts to control criminal
activity through the liquor laws are not a new
innovation. Examination of the cases and other
materials, however, reveals that even though
law enforcement agencies have had liquor license
laws available to them for over three hundred
years, rarely has the powerful device of liquor li-
cense control been used for the suppression of or-
ganized crime.
The scant use of liquor license laws for the en-
forcement of the criminal laws may be accounted
for in part by the unfortunate fact that many of
the persons charged with the responsibility of
enforcement and administration of the criminal
laws have fallen into the error of believing that
the privilege to sell liquor is in fact a property
right. The distinction is critical, since a property
right may not be taken away without due process
of law, while a license with a privilege may lose
that privilege at the pleasure of the licensing
agency.7 Often this misconception is the result of an
honest though erroneous interpretation of the law;
the property right theory, however, has been used
frequently as an escape hatch for those attempting
to undermine law enforcement.
Inasmuch as the license to sell liquor is a privi-
lege, rather than a vested right, the licensee, in
accepting the license, becomes amenable to regu-
lation which otherwise would be illegal. 8 For ex-
ample, many state statutes provide that the prem-
ises licensed to sell liquor may be searched at
6 Resolution Concerning Inns, Hutton 100, 123 Eng.
Rep. 1129 (1625). Also note that from 1736 to 1760
the purpose of the extension of the liquor license laws
was to suppress crime. Johnson & Kessler, op. cit.
supra note 5 at 229.
Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, (Del.) 22 A.
2d 397 (1941); Fitzpatrick v. Liquor Control Corn-
mission, 316 Mich. 83, 25 N.W. 2d 118 (1946); Blum v.
Ford, 194 Ark. 393, 107 S.W. 2d 340 (1937); People v.
McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N.E. 865 (1908); State v.
Williams, 173 Ind. 414, 90 N.E. 754 (1909); Harding
v. Bd. of Equalization, 90 Neb. 232, 133 N.W. 191
(1911); State v. Corron, 73 N.H. 434, 62 At. 1044
(1905); Voight v. Bd. of Excise, 59 N.J.L. 358, 36 Atl.
686 (1896); Re Grant, 44 Utah 386, 140 Pac. 226 (1914).
cf. Connecticut cases such as Quinnidiac Brewing
Co. v. Hackbarth, 74 Conn. 392, 50 Atl. 1023 (1902);
Sayer's Appeal, 89 Conn. 315, 94 Atl. 358 (1915); and
Cordand's Appeal, 91 Conn. 718, 101 At. 85 (1917)
holding that the quality of property in a license to
sell liquor is recognized to the fullest extent. Although
these cases use language of the broad brush, it must be
noted that they were decided on such questions as
validity of transfer of a liquor license, and validity of
an attachment of a liquor license. Therefore, these cases
in no way restrict the rights of the state of Connecticut
as to revocation, and do not hold that a liquor license is
property in the constitutional sense.
I ILL. REv. STAT. c. 43 §119 (1955); N.Y. ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW §114(4)(d). Also see notes
5 & 7 supra.
any time without the permission of the licensee,
as an exercise of the state police power.' Implied
in such a provision is the circumvention of the
constitutional privilege of freedom of search and
seizure without a proper warrant.Y0 It has been
the experience of some law enforcement officers
that asking for a warrant to search a gambling
house is equivalent to a direct warning to the
operators of the establishments that a raid is to be
instituted." Under the provisions of the various
alcoholic beverage control acts relating to search
and seizure, the officer need not trouble himself
with the formality of a warrant. These provisions
put teeth into the efforts of the liquor control
laws to control illegal gambling activity.
12
Furthermore, though there is a sparsity of cases
on this point, it is submitted that evidence seized
during such permissive searches of licensed prem-
ises is admissible in a subsequent criminal action
against the licensee for gambling, independent of
the license revocation proceedings, on the grounds
that the evidence was obtained through lawful
search. Similarly, such evidence should be avail-
able against patrons of the gambling house since
they lack the necessary proprietary interest in the
evidence to have standing to object to its admis-
sion in court.
13
9CAL. CODES rNN., Business and Professions
§§25753; Sandelin v. Collins, 1 Cal. 2d 147, 33 P. 2d
1009 (1934); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 43 §§108, 112, 148,
162, 190 (1955); N. Y. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL
LAW §17(7); Wis. STAT. §§139.06, 176.63 (1955).
"This only applies to those jurisdictions following
the so called federal rule of privilege. See Weeks v. U. S.,
232 U. S. 383 (1914), where it was held that evidence
secured by means of an illegal search and seizure was
inadmissible. The other view is the majority and
common law rule, that the method of obtaining evi-
dence has no bearing upon the admissibility of that
evidence, and that the party offended may seek his
remedy in trespass only. See 8 WINMOTRE, EVIDENCE
§§2183-2184 (3d ed. 1940).
" Interview with Mr. Peterson, see note 2 supra.
12 For a unique provision relating to search warrants
see WXIS. STAT. sec. 963.03(2) (1955) which provides
that "Upon application of an employee of the com-
missioner of taxation or the attorney general to a court
of record, a warrant may be issued to search for gam-
bling devices... or intoxicating liquors believed to be
concealed on premises located in the county where the
warrant is issued, or any county adjacent thereto...."
This statute recognized the fact that gamblers may
control the politics of their county, and therefore make
an ordinary search with warrant completely unoro-
ductive.
13 Criminal prosecution of customers of a gambling
house may be an effective means of closing the opera-
tion. See note 2 supra. On the proprietary interest re-
quirement see Agnello v. United States. 269 U. S. 20
(1925) where the court held that a can of narcotics was
admissible against defendants who had no constitu-
tional right in it. c.f. McDonald v. United States, 335
U. S. 451 (1948) where even those with no proprietary
interest were allowed to exclude evidence.
[Voi. 49
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The most commonly used method for the elimi-
nation of the criminal element from the retail liquor
business is a statutory provision that no license
shall be granted to an applicant who has been
convicted of a felony or other crime involving
moral turptitude. 14 These grounds also are speci-
fied as a basis for the revocation of a license al-
ready issued, or refusal to renew an expired li-
cense.
In practical application, however, these pro-
visions have not been very satisfactory in attaining
their objectives. It is an easy matter for criminal
elements to procure a person with previously un-
impeachable character to apply for a license and
thus lend al air of respectability to the licensed
premises. Moreover, it is rather apparent that some
of the most active members of the criminal syndi-
cate show a remarkable ability to avoid both ar-
rest and conviction. A partial solution to this
problem would be a statute providing that no
license shall be granted to an applicant who has a
reputation for criminal activity in the commu-
nity.15 Although this type of statute might be
challenged on due process grounds, it should be
kept in mind that there is no right to sell liquor,
and that even where the licensee is not himself a
criminal, the fact that he has a reputation for
criminal activity might attract violators to his
door. California. Illinois, and Wisconsin do have
statutory provisions of this type. 16 In a jurisdic-
tion having such a provision, not only is it un-
necessary to prove conviction for a crime, but the
fact of bad reputation need only be proven by sub-
stantial evidence, as opposed to the requirement
in criminal cass of proof of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. The reason for the distinction is that
proceedings for revocation of a liquor license are
administrative and civil in nature, rather than
criminal. It is thus possible to attack an illegal
enterprise without being limited by the strict
requirements of a criminal trial. Furthermore,
it is not necessary that an actual crime be proved,
but only conduct deemed violative of the public
"4 CAL. CODES ANN., Business and Professions §2
3952; ILL. REV. STAT., c. 43 §120 (1955); KAN. GEN.
STAT. §41-311 (1949); N.Y. ALconIoLc BEVERAGE
CONTROL LAW §110; WIs. STAT. §176.05(9) (1955);
N.J. REV. STAT. §33: 25 (1937).
15 A somewhat similar provision is found in CAL.
CODES. AmN., Business and Profession §24200(e) where
it is stated that the fact that the premises c the
licensee are a resort for certain stipulated illegal ac-
tivities may be proven by general reputation in the
community.
16 CAL. CODES AN N., Business and Professions sec
24200(a); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 43 &J(2) (19 55); Wis.
STAT. §176.05(9) (1955).
morals. 7 Some courts have gone so far as to hold
that hearing and notice need not be extended to the
licensee.'
8
Some jurisdictions attack the problem of gam-
bling on licensed premises by statutes providing
that gambling itself is a ground for license revoca-
tion." Such provisions vary as to whether they
require that the licensee have knowledge of the
gambling on his premises, but a few jurisdictions
requiring proof of such knowledge impute it to the
licensee upon a finding that his agent had actual
knowledge." There might be some question
as to the legality of imputing the agent's knowl-
edge to the principal in these implied knowledge
"provisions, but any doubt is belied by the civil
nature of the enforcement proceedings. Hence,
it is permissible to use the conventional doctrine
of respondeat superior in this aspect of enforce-
ment of the gambling laws. The purpose of the
statutory scheme is protection of the public and
not punishment of the individual. This is an area
in which individual liberty to conduct a business
must yield to the highest public policy. One wish-
ing to sell liquor, which is a privilege and not a
right, must be held responsible for the proximate
results of his business conduct.
The "clear view" provision in the Illinois Liquor
Control Act is an example of a law which, if con-
scientiously enforced, can be extremely useful in
the suppression of organized crime through
gambling control legislation. The essence of the
"clear view" provision is that there must be a
clear view of the licensed premises from the street."
There may be no obstructions placed in the win-
dows to conceal activity taking place on the prem-
ises. Since gambling is an .illegal activity, it is
necessary that it be hidden from view. Under the
'7 Maxwell Cafe v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage, 142
A.C.A. 81, 298 P. 2d 64 (1956); Cornell v. Reilly, 127
C.A. 2d 178, 273 P. 2d 572 (1954); Avon Bar & Grill
v. O'Connell, 301 N.Y. 150, 93 N.E. 2d 573 (1950).
s This is a question of statutory construction. Where
the statute expressly permits revocation without hear-
ing, the only question is one of donstitutionalitv. Cases
cited here are only to be read for illustration, since the
statute in each jurisdiction is controlling. State Bd.
of Equalization v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 2d 374,
42 P. 2d 1076 (1935); Abeln v. Shakopee, 224 Minn.
262, 28 N.W. 2d 642 (1947); Hornstein v. Illinois Liquor
Control Commission, 412 I1. 365, 106 N.E. 2d 354
(1952).
KAN1. GEN. STAT. §4 1-311,(g) (1949); N.Y. ALco-
HOLIc BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW §106; Wis. STAT.
§176.90(1) (1949).
"ILL. REV. STAT. c. 43 §185 (1955); KAN. GEN.
STAT. §41-903 (1949); N.Y. ALCOHOLic BEVERAGE
CONTROL LAW §106; Stevinsville Lake Holding Co. v.
O'Connell, 269 App. Div. 804, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 638 (1945,.
"1 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 43 §141 (1955).
19581
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"clear view" provision, the mere existence of the
hiding place is a violation of the act, subjecting
the licensee to revocation proceedings. It is un-
necessary to catch the gamblers in the illegal act
itself. This provision, coupled with provisions
granting search without a warrant, if properly
enforced, can be a powerful weapon in the hands of
law enforcement officers.
The foregoing discussion presupposes that the
officers charged with the enforcement of the liquor
license laws are honest and conscientious. Unfor-
tunately, however, there are many exceptions to
the rule. Even where the officials are not actually
dishonest, they are often responsive to outside
illegal influences in the form of bribes or political
rewards. In recognition of this situation, some
jurisdictions have enacted laws designed to in-
sure that their laws will be administered by honest
officials. The standard statute of this type pro-
vides that the persons administrating alcoholic
control laws should have no interest in any business
subject to those controls, and should accept neither
gifts nor employment from one so subjected.
2
One means of ameliorating the danger of sub-
mission to illegal pressures is to pay the law en-
forcement officers sufficient compensation for
their services. In some states the rate of compen-
sation for public officials is much too low. Almost
all states have provisions for bonds to insure faith-
ful performance, and for prosecution for malfea-
sance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office.
Wisconsin has a rather unique provision directed
toward honest administration of its liquor laws.
An officer receiving a complaint of a violation
must report it to the district attorney within ten
days of its receipt. The district attorney is then
required either to prosecute, or report his failure
to do so to the attorney general, who in turn has
the option to prosecute. The status of such cases
is to be reported to the governor.n This procedure
limits dishonesty to the unlikely case where four
individuals can be bribed.
Illinois has a provision in its liquor control laws
2 CAL. CODES AN-N., Business and Professions
§23960; ILL. REv. STAT. c. 43 §103 (1955); N.J. REV.
STAT. §33: 1-5 (1937).
23 W1S. STAT. §176.90 (1949). Kansas has a similar
statute under which the county attorney is guilty of
a misdemeanor, may be fined and imprisoned, and
removed from office for failure to prosecute. If he is
unable, neglects, or fails to enforce the act, it is the
duly of the attorney general to do so. KAN. GE N. STAT.
§41-1107 (1949).
which allows any five residents to file a complaint
with their local board. 4 The great potential in-
herent in this provision has never been fully real-
ized, principally for two reasons: first, the public
does not know that this remedy is available to it;
and secondly, in nearly every case where a com-
plaint was registered, all five complaining resi-
dents were non-lawyers. Usually the action has
been initiated or conducted by an informal group
led by a housewife or a minister. Because of this,
reversible error was found in the complaints,
and the board has been forced to find for the
licensee, due to a lack of a proper presentation of
adequate evidence
5
In almost every jurisdiction there is an adequate
liquor control statute. Although it is true that
some jurisdictions have provisions superior to
others, generally speaking, all are powerful tools
in the hands of able, honest law enforcement offi-
cers. Most of the trouble can be traced to the fact
that these statutes are not being used to their full
capacity. While dishonesty among officials is
one cause, more often this failure is due to the
fact that officers are not sufficiently familiar with
the laws themselves to enable them to employ the
various statutory provisions with maximum effec-
tiveness. There is no complete remedy for either
of these conditions. It is submitted, however, that
provisions similar to the Wisconsin "report" pro-
vision will increase official awareness of and
responsibility for the diligent prosecution and
enforcement of liquor control laws. But perhaps
the ultimate solution lies with the public and the
press. An intense campaign must be conducted to
insure capable, reputable, and well informed legis-
latures, courts, and law enforcement agencies.
24 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 43 §151 (1955).
2 Interview with W. Willard Wirtz, former Illinois
Liquor Commissioner.
Under the previous Illinois State Liquor Control
Act, the State Commission had no power to initiate
a proceeding for revocation of a state license, and its
jurisdiction was limited to reviewing orders of local
commissions, and to revoking state licenses automati-
cally upon revocation of local licenses by local com-
missioners. That section has been amended so that
specific power is now granted to the State Commission
to revoke retail licenses on its own initiation. ILL. REV.
STAT. c. 43 §109 (1955). This provision was upheld in
Plaikos v. Illinois Liquor Commission, Docket No.
46919, (1957).
This provision enables the State Commission to
take affirmative steps in cases where the local authority
does not, for one reason or another, wN ant to bring action
against a violator.
[Vol. 49
